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This paper develops a method for decomposing changes in agricultural producer prices.  The 
method builds on a procedure used by the World Bank, with the key variables in the decomposition 
being trade prices, exchange rates, and agricultural trade policies.  The main ways by which we 
expand on the World Bank decomposition procedure are by broadening the analysis of policy 
effects, and by adding the effect from incomplete transmission of changes in border prices and 
exchange rates to producer prices, and the effect on prices from interactions between variables as 
they change simultaneously.  We demonstrate the decomposition method by using the Russian 
poultry market in the late 1990s, and find that the dominant factor in changing the producer price 
was the large depreciation of the ruble.  Many developing and transition economies have fluctuating 
exchange rates.  The decomposition method presented in this paper could be used to test the 
hypothesis that exchange rate movements are the main cause of changes in these countries’ 
agricultural commodity prices.  Another hypothesis that the method could help test is that an 
important factor in affecting countries’ agricultural prices is incomplete transmission of changes in 
trade prices and exchange rates to domestic prices, where the incomplete transmission is mainly 
caused not by policy, but rather by undeveloped market infrastructure. 
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   This paper develops a method for decomposing changes in agricultural producer prices, and 
then demonstrates the method using an example from Russian agriculture.  The decomposition 
method builds on a procedure used by the World Bank, with the key variables in the decomposition 
being trade prices, exchange rates, and agricultural trade policies.  The main ways by which we 
expand on the World Bank procedure are by broadening the analysis of policy effects, and by 
adding the effect from incomplete transmission of changes in border prices and exchange rates to 
producer prices, and the effect on prices from interactions between variables as they change 
simultaneously. 
Producer price instability within a country can hurt incentives to produce and invest, as well 
as create volatility in farm income.  Trade liberalization and growing integration into world markets 
make countries’ agriculture increasingly vulnerable to fluctuations in world commodity prices and 
exchange rates.  Decomposition methods that can identify and measure the main reasons why 
agricultural producer prices change would therefore provide useful information for policymakers. 
 
1.  The World Bank Decomposition Procedure 
   Quiroz and Valdes (1993), Valdes (1996), Valdes (1999), Valdes, Olsen, and Ocana (1999), 
and Valdes (2000) present a method for decomposing changes in countries’ agricultural producer 
prices, and use the method for decomposition analysis for a number of developing and transition 
economies.  Because this work either appears mainly in World Bank (WB) publications or was done 
by WB personnel, we call this method the “World Bank decomposition procedure.”  The 
decomposition begins with the equation  
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  2where   is a country’s real producer price for a commodity in time t,  the real border (trade) 
price in foreign currency,  the real exchange rate,   the nominal rate of protection, such 
that is the nominal protection coefficient, and   a “markup” factor covering domestic 
transport and transaction costs that equalizes the domestic and border prices.  The real values for the 
domestic and border prices are determined by dividing the nominal prices in time t by domestic and 
foreign price indices with respect to the base period, while the real exchange rate is determined by 
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  The next step in the WB decomposition derivation is to put equation (1) into natural logs 
and then differentiate with respect to time, which yields the decomposition equation 
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where a dot above a variable indicates the percent change in the variable.  The term  drops 
out, because the World Bank decomposition procedure assumes that the transport/transaction costs 
as represented by g are a fixed proportion of  [ ].  We also make this assumption in our 
decomposition procedure. 
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Equation (2) decomposes  by attributing its change to the changes in P
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w, X, and the 
nominal protection coefficient  , which measures the effect that policy has on P ) 1 (
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d.  The WB 
decomposition procedure computes  as a residual: 
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  Analysis of the decomposition of 
•
d P  depends to a large degree on whether policy allows 
transmission of changes in P
w and X to P
d.  Some policies prevent transmission, because the policies 
  3fix P
d independent of P
w and X.  Such policies include managed price policies of the type the United 
States and EU have maintained in the postwar period, but are now moving away from.  Trade 
quotas also “fix” domestic producer prices, in that the quota volume interacts with domestic supply 
and demand for a commodity to determine the domestic price, independent of the trade price and 
exchange rate.  Likewise, state trading in its most typical form, whereby a government agency 
determines the volume of a commodity to be exported or imported, can act like a quota (and might 
be tied to official quotas), again insulating P
d from changes in P
w and X. 
With such policies, a “decomposition” of 
•
d P using equation (3) could yield some useful 
information.  For example, if with a managed price policy P
d > P
wX and policymakers raise P
d, 
will increase (ceteris paribus), indicating that the price rise has increased the nominal rate 




d P should require that P
d is 
a function of the variables used in its decomposition.  Policies that fix P
d make the price 
independent of P
w and X.  Consequently, changes in P
w and X will not by themselves change P
d, 
such that attributing any change in P
d to ΔPP
w or ΔX becomes problematic.  This point does not 
mean that when policy largely fixes P
d, the WB decomposition procedure is inadequate and should 
be replaced by a better method.  Rather, it raises the question of how much economic sense there is 
in decomposing 
•
d P when policy determines the value of P
d.  
If agricultural price and trade policies that fix prices were dominant in countries throughout 
the world, one might conclude from the above discussion that the decomposition of changes in 
agricultural producer prices is not a very relevant issue.  However, such policies as they exist are 
diminishing, and the world in general is clearly moving toward policies that allow transmission.  
For example, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture banned import quotas, non-tariff 
  4measures maintained through state trading enterprises, and most other non-tariff trade barriers, 
requiring countries to tariffy border measures. 
  The WB decomposition procedure can serve as a useful first step in decomposing changes in 
PP
d when policy allows transmission of changes in P
w and X to P
d.  It, however, has certain 
limitations.  One deficiency, which the authors of the cited studies acknowledge, is that the 
procedure misvalues the contribution to 
•
d P of the change in policy, as represented by  , for 
the following reason.  Given that P
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w, X, and   change simultaneously, equation (2) is 




w P , 
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being multiplied by each other.  The derivation of equation (2) is based on the assumption that all 
multiplicative terms are small enough to be ignored.  The decomposition equation with the 
interactive multiplicative terms included is 
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Comparing   in equations (3) and (5), we see that   in equation (3) misvalues the 
effect of policy changes on 
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d P .  This happens because equation (3) does not include  −
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X P
w  in the 
right-side numerator, and also does not include   in the denominator (or what should 
be the denominator).  Our decomposition will avoid this misvaluation of policy effects. 
• • • •
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  Another limitation of the WB decomposition procedure is that a decomposition that provides 
more information is possible.  The following example demonstrates the point.  Let P
w = 50, X = 2, 
  5and tariff rate (t) = 0.2, such that P
d = 120.  If P
w rises to 75, P
d increases by 60 to 180.  50 of the 
increase results from a direct price effect (25 x 2), while 10 of the increase results from interaction 
of the rise in P
w with the tariff (25 x 2 x 0.2).  The latter can be called an implicit policy effect, 
which occurs when a tariff exists and P
w or X changes.  Although the tariff rate need not change, the 
rise in P
d from this effect occurs because of the existence of the tariff.  We can distinguish between 
an implicit policy effect and an explicit policy effect, which occurs when the tariff rate changes.  
The implicit and explicit policy effects that can be identified in decomposing changes in P
d are 
similar to the implicit and explicit policy effects that Tangermann (2003) identifies in analyzing 
changes in the market price support part of producer support estimates (PSEs). 
  When policy allows transmission of changes in P
w and X to P
d, P
d can change not only 
because of the direct price effect and policy effects, but also because of deficient market 
infrastructure.  Developing and transition economies in particular can suffer from poor 
infrastructure, which can have two main effects.  First, it can result in high internal 
transport/transaction costs.  Second, it can create the market imperfection of incomplete information 
(Fackler and Goodwin 2001, Barrett 2001, Barrett and Li 2002).  In particular, producers in isolated 
areas might be unaware of prices (and especially price movements) in the domestic markets where 
their output competes with imports.  Incomplete information can reduce the transmission of changes 
in P
w and X to P
d.  The change in P
w or X is the active element in changing P
d, though the change in 
PP
w and X combines with incomplete transmission, caused by undeveloped market infrastructure, to 
change P
d.  We call this the incomplete transmission effect on P
d.     
  The next section develops an alternative method to that of the WB for decomposing changes 
in producer prices when policy allows transmission of changes in P
w and X to P
d.  The method will 
allow one to isolate and measure the direct price effect, policy effects (both explicit and implicit), 
  6and incomplete transmission effect on P
d. 
  
2.  The Decomposition Method 
 
We first derive the decomposition equation when an ad valorem tariff exists, and then 
examine how the equation should be altered when other transmission-allowing policies are 
operative.  The derivation begins with  
• •
≡
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 , where t is the tariff rate.  
 is the duty included landed price (henceforth called simply landed price).  It gives the 
value of the imported good immediately after it clears customs, and thereby equals the cif (cost, 
insurance, freight) value plus the tariff.  In a well-functioning market economy, and assuming that 
internal transport/transaction costs for imports are the same as for domestic output, this value should 
determine the domestic producer price for the commodity. 
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 .  This 
gives the price transmission elasticity (PTE) between the landed price and domestic producer price.  
We define e as the PTE, such that  
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The presence of the PTE (e) in the decomposition equation will allow analysis and 
measurement of the effect on P
d of incomplete transmission from ΔPP
w and ΔX to P
d (the incomplete 
transmission effect).  In order to isolate the effect of incomplete transmission, we insert for the PTE 
not e, but rather (e + k – k), where 
e k − = 1            ( 9 )  
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The letters below the equation identify the two right side terms.  If transmission from change 
in the landed price to P
d were complete (e = 1, such that k = 0), term B drops out.  Assume that 
transmission is incomplete, such that e, k < 1.  The logic of our decomposition approach is that it 
isolates and measures the effect on P
d assuming that transmission is complete (as measured by term 
A), as well as the effect on P
d from the incomplete transmission that exists (as measured by term B).  
B measures the degree to which P
d fails to change to the maximum extent possible because of 
incomplete transmission, or put differently, it measures the degree to which incomplete 
transmission cuts into this potential change.  The sum of the two parts gives the net effect based on 
the actual value of e. 
The purpose of the decomposition equation is to allow us to measure the shares of 
•
d P  
which are caused by, and therefore can be attributed to, 
•
w P , 
•
X , and  .  This requires that in the 
final form of the decomposition equation, no term contains the percent change of either a sum or 
product of two or more of these variables.  In terms A and B, the additive term (1 + t) exists within 
•
t
  8the larger term  .  We want to break   into its two additive parts.  This is 
done by using the result that the percent change of a sum of two numbers equals the sum of the of 
percent change in each number, weighted by each number’s share in their sum.  This gives the 
following:   
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The letters under each term again identify that term. The next step is to deal with the percent 
change of a product of two or more variables.  Attributing the share of individual variables to the 
change in their product appears to be a problem without a definite mathematical solution.  In its 
decomposition of the change in the market price support part of PSEs, OECD confronts the same 
issue.  OECD (2002) employs a procedure that yields subterms that contain changes in only single 
variables, with no changes in the product of two or more variables.  We therefore use OECD’s 
approach for handling the problem.
 
In term C in equation (13), the subterms associated with
•
w P and 
•
X (obtained after 
employing OECD’s method) measure the change in P
d from the direct price effect that occurs from 
ΔPP
w and ΔX.  In term D, the subterm associated with   measures the change in P
•
t
d from the explicit 
policy effect, while the subterms associated with 
•
w P and 
•
X measure the change in P
d from the 
implicit policy effects (resulting from ΔP
w
P  and ΔX interacting with the tariff).  The magnitudes of 
all the effects in terms C and D are based on the assumption of complete transmission of change in 
the landed price to P








d from the incomplete transmission effect, which results from changes in P
w, X, and t 
  9being only partially transmitted to P
d. 
   The derivation of the decomposition equation when the tariff is a fixed per unit tax is similar 
to the derivation when the tariff is ad valorem.  The landed price of the imported good now equals 
[P
wX + T], where T is the per unit tariff.  The only difference in the derivation compared to the ad 
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Another policy that can allow transmission from ΔPP
w and ΔX to P
d is technical barriers to 
trade (TBTs), defined to include sanitary and phytosanitary measures.  If a country imposes a TBT 
on imports of a commodity, the typical consequence is that foreign suppliers must incur costs to 
satisfy the regulation.  If the per unit cost of satisfying the barrier is B, the landed price for the 
import in the country imposing the barrier is (P
w + B)X.  In deriving the decomposition equation, in 
equation (6) one now multiplies 
•


























1  . 
 
3.  Empirical Example: The Producer Price for Russian Poultry 
 
  The example we use to demonstrate the decomposition method is the change in P
d for 
Russian poultry producers over the period 1997-99.  Since the mid 1990’s, poultry has been 
Russia’s biggest agricultural import commodity (in value terms).  The period 1997-99 is chosen 
because it spans Russia’s economic crisis that hit in 1998.  One effect of the crisis was a severe 
depreciation in the ruble, which gives the example the interesting feature of major change in the 
exchange rate.  The two year period 1997-99 is used because the crisis hit in August 1998, such that 
much of the crisis’ economic effects (on domestic prices and exchange rates, among other variables) 
  10did not play out until 1999. 
During 1997-99, Russia had a 30 percent tariff on imported poultry, though with the 
condition that a minimum tariff be applied of 0.3 European Currency Units (ECUs) per kilo of 
imports.  Another qualification is that in 1999, Russia received food aid from the United States and 
EU, including some poultry.  Russia’s receipt of food aid can be viewed as a policy decision, which 
affected domestic prices.  As explained in Liefert (2006), uncertainty concerning the effects and 
interplay of the minimum per unit tariff and food aid is such that one could represent the net policy 
effect two different ways: (1) by applying the minimum tariff to all poultry imports; and (2) 
applying the ad valorem rate to all imports, but cut the tariff rate from 30 to 15 percent.  In 
decomposing the change in the price gap between the domestic and border price using this specific 
example, Liefert (2006) presents decomposition results for both policy representations.  In this 
paper, we present results for a drop in the tariff from 30 to 15 percent, mainly because it gives a 
more interesting illustration of the decomposition procedure. 
The first step in generating the decomposition results is, using equation (7), to compute the 
PTE (e) between the landed price [P
wX (1 + t)] and the producer price P
d.  The value is 37 percent.  
Table 1 gives the decomposition results, which incorporate this transmission value.  The column   
gives the actual percent change in P
•
V
d and the variables that determine P
d (computed from OECD’s 
database for Russian PSEs, OECD).  The column shows that from 1997 to 1999, the real P
d for 
Russian poultry rose 27 percent.  The real border price P
w (expressed in ECUs) fell 17 percent, and 
the real ruble/ECU exchange rate X rose 137 percent.  The 50 percent drop in t results from the 
decline in the tariff rate from 30 to 15 percent as discussed in the previous paragraph. 
The other columns measure the degree to which changes in these variables change P
d, 
measured by the percent change in P
d.  The three columns under “e + k = 1” give the effects on P
d 
  11based on the assumption that transmission of the change in the landed price to producer price is 
complete.  Through the direct price effect, the drop in P
w decreases P
d by 22 percent, while the rise 
in X increases P
d by 97 percent.  The aggregate direct price effect is to raise P
d 75 percent. 
The fall in the tariff rate has the explicit policy effect of reducing P
d 18 percent.  The drop in 
PP
w has the implicit policy effect of reducing P
d 5 percent, while the rise in X has the implicit policy 
effect of increasing P
d 22 percent.  The aggregate policy effect is a decline in P
d of 1 percent.  The 
combined effect of changes in all variables if transmission were complete is to increase P
d 74 
percent. 
 The  column  “− k” measures the incomplete transmission effect on P
d which results from 
changes in variables that affect P
d interacting with incomplete transmission.  The fall in P
w reduces 
PP
d.  Because of incomplete transmission, P
d declines less than it would with complete transmission.  
The failure of P
d to drop by the potential maximum has the attributable effect of raising P
d by 17 
percent.  Likewise, the rise in X increases P
d.  Yet, because of incomplete transmission, P
d rises less 
than it could.  The failure of P
d to increase by its potential maximum has the attributable effect of 
reducing P
d by 75 percent.  The halving of the tariff rate t decreases P
d.  However, because of 
incomplete transmission, 11 percentage points of the potential drop in P
d also does not materialize.  
The aggregate effect of the changes in P
w, X, and t combining with incomplete transmission (not 
caused by any apparent policies that fix domestic prices) is to lower P
d by 47 percent. 
 The  column  “e” gives the net effect of changes in the causal variables on P
d.  Figures in this 
column equal the values in the column “combined effect” under “e + k = 1” and the column “− k.”  
The results show that the net attributable effect of the drop in P
w is to decrease P
d by 10 percent; the 
net attributable effect of the rise in X is to increase P
d 44 percent; while the net attributable effect of 
the decline in t is to decrease P
d 7 percent.  The total net effect is to raise P
d  27 percent.  Note that 
  12throughout the decomposition, the dominant factor in changing P
d is the large increase in X (which 
reflects major depreciation of the Russian ruble). 
  Table 1 also gives decomposition results for 
•
d P  using the WB decomposition procedure, 
which we can compare to results using our method.  The WB decomposition results attributable to 
•
w P and 
•
X conceptually are most similar to our results from the direct price effect, and the actual 
decomposition calculations from these two columns are somewhat close.  The main reason our 
decomposition net results for 
•
w P and 
•
X  are lower than those from the WB procedure is because 
our decomposition has the incomplete transmission effect attributable to the changes in P
w and X. 
The result in the table for “t” in the WB decomposition gives the effect on P
d from change in 
the nominal protection coefficient  .  The WB result attributed to   of  -93 percent 
differs substantially from our result for   (the tariff rate) of -7 percent.  One might think that this 
difference occurs mainly because the WB procedure computes the effect on P
) 1 (
p t +
8 7 6 •




d from   while 
our approach computes the effect from just  .  This, however, is not the case.  Equation (13) gives 
the effect on P
8 7 6 •




d attributable to   in the form of the effect from  .   The easiest way to 














.  Assume in equation (13) that only t changes, and 
that transmission is complete such that k = 0.  This results in terms C, E, and F dropping out.  The 







There are two main reasons for the large difference between the WB’s calculation of the 
  13effect on P
d from  and our calculation of the effect on P
8 7 6 •
+ ) 1 (
p t
d from  .  First, the WB approach 
misstates the value of  because it calculates the term as a residual and thereby attributes to 
the term all the interactive multiplicative relationships between the variables (as discussed 
previously).  The changes in the variables in our Russian poultry example are large such that the 
multiplicative terms are also substantial in size.  Second, the WB approach includes in   the 
incomplete transmission effect, which we attribute largely to deficient market infrastructure.  If in 
the WB decomposition procedure, the effect on P
•
t
8 7 6 •
+ ) 1 (
p t
8 7 6 •
+ ) 1 (
p t
d from   is intended to measure the effect of 
changes in agriculture-targeted policies alone, such as those involving market intervention, the 
procedure could misvalue the effect on P
8 7 6 •
+ ) 1 (
p t
d (and perhaps strongly so). 
 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper presents a method for decomposing changes in agricultural producer prices, the 
key variables in the decomposition analysis being trade prices, exchange rates, and trade policies.  
Demonstration of the method using the Russian poultry price over 1997-99 shows that the main 
cause of change in the price was the large depreciation in the ruble, a consequence of the severe 
economic crisis that hit the country in 1998.  Many developing and transition economies have 
highly fluctuating exchange rates.  The decomposition method presented in this paper could be used 
to test the hypothesis that the main cause of changes in these countries’ agricultural commodity 
prices is exchange rate volatility.  Another hypothesis, also supported by the Russian empirical 
example, which the decomposition method could help test is that an important factor in affecting 
countries’ prices is incomplete transmission of changes in trade prices and exchange rates to 
domestic prices, where the incomplete transmission is mainly caused not by policy, but rather by 
  14undeveloped market infrastructure. 
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w P   -17            -22  -5  -27  17        -10  -17 
X   137            97  22  119  -75       44  137 
t  -50           na  -18  -18  11        -7  -93 
 
d P   27           75  -1  74  -47     27  27 
 
Source: For   , database for Russian PSEs (OECD), and PlanEcon and Bureau of Labor Statistics for the Russian and 
foreign (U.S.) producer price indices used to move from nominal prices and exchange rate to real values. For contribution 






d P , own calculations. 
 
Note:  The WB decomp column gives results based on the World Bank decomposition method. The figure associated with 
 in this column gives the effect of change in the nominal protection coefficient, as measured by  .  “na” means 
not applicable. 
t ) 1 (
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